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Abstract—This paper analyzes and compares different incentive mechanisms for a master to motivate the collaboration of smartphone
users on both data acquisition and distributed computing applications. To collect massive sensitive data from users, we propose
a reward-based collaboration mechanism, where the master announces a total reward to be shared among collaborators, and the
collaboration is successful if there are enough users wanting to collaborate. We show that if the master knows the users’ collaboration
costs, then he can choose to involve only users with the lowest costs. However, without knowing users’ private information, then
he needs to offer a larger total reward to attract enough collaborators. Users will benefit from knowing their costs before the data
acquisition. Perhaps surprisingly, the master may benefit as the variance of users’ cost distribution increases.
To utilize smartphones’ computation resources to solve complex computing problems, we study how the master can design an
optimal contract by specifying different task-reward combinations for different user types. Under complete information, we show that
the master involves a user type as long as the master’s preference characteristic outweighs that type’s unit cost. All collaborators
achieve a zero payoff in this case. If the master does not know users’ private cost information, however, he will conservatively target at
a smaller group of users with small costs, and has to give most benefits to the collaborators.
Index Terms—Smartphone application, data acquisition, distributed computing, game theory, contract theory
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
Smartphones are becoming the mainstream in mobile
phones. According to a survey by ComScore in 2010,
over 45.5 million people owned smartphones out of 234
million total mobile phone subscribers in the United
States [2]. In 2012, the global smartphone shipments
grew 43% annually by reaching a record 700 million
units [3].
Given millions of smartphones sold annually, recent
phone applications start to utilize the power of smart-
phone users’ collaborations [4], [5]. In such an appli-
cation, there is a master (e.g., Apple or Google in the
following examples) who wants to implement some
application or service based on user collaborations. We
can categorize these applications in two types as follows.
In the first type of data acquisition application, a master
wants to acquire enough data from smartphone users to
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build up a database. According to [5], Apple’s iPhone
and Google’s Android smartphones regularly transmit
their owners’ location data (including GPS coordinates)
back to Apple and Google without users’ agreements,
respectively. For example, an Android phone collects its
location data every few seconds and transmits the data
to Google at least several times an hour. The phone also
transmits back the name, location, and signal strength
of any nearby Wi-Fi networks. After collecting enough
location data from users, Google can successfully build
a massive database capable of providing location-based
services. One service can be live map of auto traffics,
where the dynamics of users’ location data on a highway
indicate whether there is a traffic jam. Another service
can be constructing a large-scale public Wi-Fi map. Ac-
cording to [6], the global location-based service market is
growing strongly, and its revenue is expected to increase
from US$2.8 billions to US$10.3 billions between 2010
and 2015. In order to perform the above data acquisition,
a lot of efforts need to be spent to get users’ consent
and protect users’ privacy (e.g., [7]–[10]). When a user
collaborates in this kind of applications, he will incur a
cost such as loss of privacy.
In the second type of distributed computing applica-
tion, a master wants to solve complex engineering or
commercial problems inexpensively using distributed
computation power. Smartphones now have powerful
and power-efficient processors (e.g., Dual-core A6 chip
of Apple iPhone 5 which is comparable to many laptops’
CPUs several years ago), outstanding battery life, abun-
dant memory, and open operating systems (e.g., Google
Android) [11] that make them suitable for complex
2processing tasks. Since millions of smartphones remain
unused most of the time, a master might want to so-
licit smartphone collaborations in distributed computing
(e.g., [12]–[14]). In this case, a user’s collaboration cost
may be due to loss of energy and reduction of physical
storage.
In this paper, we will design incentive mechanism
for smartphone collaborations in data acquisition and
distributed computing applications, both of which aim to
incentivize users to participate the collaboration through
proper rewards. Then we can compare the similarity and
difference in mechanism design for both applications.
For each type of applications, we will similarly consider
various information scenarios, depending on what the
master and users know. In particular, the master may
or may not know each smartphone user’s characteristics
such as collaboration costs and collaboration efficiencies.
The two types of applications have different require-
ments and lead to different models. Collaborators in
data acquisition usually take similar tasks and hence
should be rewarded similarly, whereas collaborators in
distributed computing will undertake different amounts
of work according to their different computation capabil-
ities. More specifically, in data acquisition applications,
we consider a threshold-based revenue model, where a
master can earn a fixed positive revenue only if he can
involve enough (larger than a threshold) smartphone
users as collaborators, such that he can build a large
enough database to support the application like the live
map of auto traffics. Since data acquisition only requires
simple periodic data reporting, we can assume that users
are homogeneous in contribution and efficiency.1 In dis-
tributed computing applications, however, we consider
a model where the master’s revenue increases in users’
efforts. Also, users are heterogeneous in computing effi-
ciencies and should be treated differently. For example,
the most efficient users should be highly rewarded to
encourage them to undertake large tasks.
Our key results and contributions are as follows:
• New reward-based mechanism to motivate data acquisi-
tion: We propose a Stackelberg game model under
incomplete information that captures interactions
between the master and users in Section 2. The
master first announces the total reward to be allo-
cated among collaborators. To decide to join or not,
each user then estimates other users’ decisions in
predicting the chance of collaboration success and
his expected reward. We show that it is better to
reward users’ collaboration efforts regardless the
result of the collaboration. This encourages users
to collaborate, and hence increases the chance of
collaboration success.
1. For example, a huge number users take the same simple task by
periodically reporting their GPS location data, and it is reasonable and
fair for the master to reward them equally (as in Amazon Mechanical
Turk). It is actually difficult for the master to differentiate contributions
and rewards differentially to a huge number of users, and monitoring
and updating his beliefs of users’ private information is often imprac-
tical.
• Performance of reward-based mechanism: Under com-
plete or symmetrically incomplete information, the
master can decide a small reward to attract enough
users. But if users know their costs while the master
does not (asymmetrically incomplete information),
the master has to offer a large total reward to guar-
antee enough collaborators, and users benefit from
holding private information. Perhaps surprisingly,
when the master does not need a large number of
collaborators, he can benefit as the variance of users’
cost distribution increases.
• New contract-based mechanism to motivate distributed
computing: In Section 3, we use contract theory to
study how a master efficiently decides different
task-reward combinations for heterogeneous users.
By satisfying individual rationality and incentive
compatibility, our contract enables all users to truth-
fully reveal their private information and maximizes
the master’s utility.
• Performance of contract-based mechanism: Under com-
plete information, the master involves a user type
as long as the master’s preference of the type is
larger than the user cost. All collaborators get a zero
payoff. But if users can hold their private informa-
tion from the master, the master will conservatively
target at a smaller group of efficient users with
small costs. He has to give most benefits to the
collaborators and a collaborator’s payoff increases
in the computing efficiency.
1.1 Related Work
Our first collaboration model on data acquisition is
closely related to the literature on location-based ser-
vices (LBS) [15]. In LBS, a customer needs to report
his current location to the database server in order to
receive his desired service. Prior work are focusing on
how to manage data and how customers can safely
communicate with the database server (e.g., [9], [10],
[16]), especially when the massive database has already
been built up. Other work considered the technical issues
of data collection from users [16]. Our paper focuses
on the master’s problem of incentive mechanism design
for attracting enough users (larger than some threshold)
using reward to provide location data, so that the master
can build a LBS later on. Only recently people started
to look at users’ incentives to reveal information. For
example, Yang et al. [17] also designed incentive mecha-
nisms for involving sensors. The model in [17] does not
involve the issue of collaboration cost estimation and
collaboration success probability, and the main results
were mainly derived through simulations. Actually, most
Stackelberg game models assume complete information
yet this paper focuses on incomplete information.
Our second collaboration model is relevant to mo-
bile grid computing, which integrates mobile wireless
devices into grid computing (e.g., [18]–[20]). The main
focus of mobile grid computing literature is on the tech-
nical issues of resource management or load balancing
3(e.g., [19], [20]). Only few results have considered (mo-
bile) users’ incentives issues in joining in collaboration
[21]–[23]. Kwok et al. in [22] evaluate the impact of selfish
behaviors of individual users in a Grid. Subrata et al. in
[23] present a Nash bargaining solution for load balanc-
ing among multiple masters. Sim in [21] use a two-player
alternating bargaining model to study collaboration be-
tween masters and users. The novelty of our model is
that a master interacts with all users simultaneously to
distribute computing work, and users are heterogeneous
in their computing efficiencies and costs. We propose
a new contract-based mechanism that maximizes the
master’s profit.2 Unlike our first collaboration model
using a total reward to incentivize the same periodic data
acquisition, here this contract mechanism aims to assign
different amounts of work to different user types, and
does not require a threshold-based collaboration success.
2 COLLABORATIONS ON DATA ACQUISITION
2.1 System Model of Data Acquisition
In this application, the master is interested in building
up a database by collecting information from enough
smartphone users. We consider a set N = {1, · · · , N}
of smartphones, and the total number N is publicly
known.3 User i ∈ N has a collaboration cost Ci(pi, ei) >
0, which is generally a function (e.g., weighted sum) of
his privacy loss pi and energy consumption ei illustrated
as follows:
• Privacy loss pi: By reporting sensitive data (e.g., GPS
location coordinates), a user’s loss can be psycho-
logical worry of losing privacy, discomfort due to
frequent annoyance from unwanted advertising in
location-based services, or even property loss due
to disclosure of bank account information in data
reporting (e.g., [26]–[28]).
• Energy consumption ei: Collecting and transmitting
data periodically to the master’s data center con-
sumes a user’s smartphone battery. According to
[29] and [30], the consumed energy depends on the
details of the data acquisition task, including the
interaction efficiency among various layers (e.g., ra-
dio channel state, transport layer, application layer,
and user interaction layer). The measurement data
(e.g., radio power) for some typical applications and
platforms can be found in [29] and [30].
We assume that the distributions of users’ privacy
losses and energy consumptions are independent. As
combinations of the two terms, we assume that the
collaboration costs are independently and identically
distributed, with a mean µ and a cumulative probability
2. Our designed contract-based mechanism here belongs to screening
contract category [24] and is similar to that in our previous work
[25] in methodology, but that work focuses on a different problem
on cooperative spectrum sharing and the derived mechanisms as well
as results are significantly different.
3. We assume all N users are active. The master (e.g., Apple) learns
the number of active users (e.g., iPhones) by checking users’ usage
history, or send users control messages for status confirmation.
distribution function F (·).4 We do not impose any fur-
ther assumptions on the properties of the distribution
F (·) in this paper.
We consider a threshold revenue model for the master.
If the master attracts at least n0 users as collaborators,
he will successfully build the database and receive a
revenue of V . Otherwise, the master does not receive
any revenue. Such a threshold model has many practi-
cal applications. In the example of collecting GPS data
to establish a live map of auto traffics, several users’
movement information along the same highway will be
enough to tell whether the highway is congested or not.
As shown in Fig. 1, the master interacts with the users
through a two-stage process. In Stage I, the master an-
nounces (R, n0), where R is the total reward to all users
and n0 is the threshold number of required collaborators.
In Stage II, each user chooses to be a collaborator or
not.5 Similar to Amazon Mechanical Turk,6 the master
here sets up a database with users’ account and payment
information and can automatically pay each involved
user. A user’s received reward can be monetary return
or some promotion to use the relevant location-based
service afterwards.
We want to mention that our model is also applicable
to the scenario where users do not join the collaboration
simultaneously. As long as users submit their “sealed”
responses to the master’s collaboration invitation and
cannot check others’ behaviors, our results will remain
valid. On the other hand, if a user learns from others’
behaviors to determine the current number of committed
users, then the analysis of such a dynamic decision evo-
lution becomes very challenging. Some methods about
social learning and mean field approximation may be
used in the scenario (though clean theoretical results are
still hard to obtain) ([31], [32]).
Assume that there are n out of N users willing to serve
as collaborators in Stage II. There are two models for a
collaborator’s payoff:
• Model (A) (Reward for collaboration effort): A collabo-
rator i’s payoff is(
R
n
− Ci
)
1{n≥n0}. (1)
where 1{X} is the indicator function (equals 1 when
event X is true). That is, if the collaboration is
successful, user i pays his collaboration cost Ci,
and gets the reward R/n (equally and fairly shared
4. This assumption makes our analysis tractable to deliver clean
engineering insights. Yet our results can be extended to the case where
the costs are not identically distributed. Then, for example, a user with
a larger mean value of cost distribution is less willing to collaborate.
5. To support some real-time location-based services (e.g., maps of
live traffic information), we require users’ quick responses in order to
update the database. Such a quick collection of data is feasible now
(e.g., like invitation messaging to reveal location in many iPhone apps).
Amazon Mechanical Turk also supports online interaction between
masters and users. Some media masters like Google may also have
urgent needs to report some critical events by asking users in a certain
area to upload photos and videos.
6. See the Amazon link https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome
4Stage I: (Master rewarding)
The operator decides and announces a total reward
R and the required collaborator number n0 to users
Stage II: (Users’ collaboration)
Each user decides whether to join the collaboration or
not by predicting others users’ costs and decisions
Fig. 1. Stackelberg game between the master and users.
among n collaborators since they undertake the
same task in fixed and periodic data reporting). We
can also view R/n as in a lottery scenario where
each collaborator having equal probability 1/n to
win the total reward R. In this case, n users will
only collaborate if the master notifies them that
n ≥ n0 and the collaboration will be successful. This
means that no users will pay collaboration cost if the
collaboration is not successful. Here, we assume that
the master will truthfully inform the collaborators
about the value of n.7
• Model (B) (Reward only with successful collaboration):
A collaborator i receives a payoff
R
n
1{n≥n0} − Ci. (2)
That is, collaborator i always pays his collaboration
cost Ci, and will get the reward R/n only if the
collaboration is successful. This model considers
that collaborators will contribute before they know
the value of n (which will be announced to them by
the master after data acquisition).
In both model, the master obtains a profit of
(V −R)1{n≥n0}.
For illustration purpose, we now only focus on Model
(A) in this section. The discussion of Model (B) can be
found in Appendix F. It should be noted that users under
Model (A) are more willing to collaborate than under
Model (B), which is not surprising since they face a lower
risk in Model (A). The master also prefers Model (A) to
Model (B) since he needs to compensate lower risk and
fewer cost to motivate users’ collaboration.
The collaboration game is a two-stage Stackelberg game,
and we would like to characterize the subgame perfect
equilibrium (SPE) that specifies players’ stable choices
in all stages [33]. The way to analyze Stackelberg game
is backward induction. The master in Stage I and users
in Stage II are risk-neutral and want to maximize their
own payoffs, repectively. We will first analyze Stage II,
7. In reality, the master may cheat users by announcing a larger value
of n, then he can give less reward to each actual collaborator. But there
are some approaches to prevent this. For example, there could be a
third party to monitor how many collaborators are finally involved
and punish the master if cheating is detected.
where the users play a game among themselves based on
the value of the reward R and the threshold n0.8 Users
reach a Nash equilibrium (NE) in this stage, if no user can
improve his payoff by changing his strategy (collaborate
or not) unilaterally. The Nash equilibrium in Stage II
leads to a collaboration success probability P (n ≥ n0|R).
As we will see, there may be multiple Nash equilibria
in Stage II. Then we study Stage I, where the master
chooses the value of R to maximize his expected profit
(V −R)P (n ≥ n0|R). These two-step analysis enables us
to obtain an SPE of the whole two-stage collaboration
game.
Next we will analyze the Stackelberg game, and study
how the master’s and the users’ information about the
collaboration costs will affect the outcome.
2.2 Collaboration under Complete Information
We first consider the complete information scenario,
where the master and all users know the cost Ci of
every user i ∈ N . This is possible only in some special
cases where the master and users have extensive prior
collaboration experiences. The main reason for studying
this model is to provide a performance benchmark for
later discussions of more realistic incomplete informa-
tion scenarios.
We assume that no two users have the exactly same
cost. Our results also apply to the case of homogeneous
users, where we can randomly break the tie among
homogeneous users at the boundary. This will lead to
more than one equilibrium. Without loss of generality,
we reorder the users’ costs in ascending order, i.e.,
C1 < C2 < ... < CN and Cn0 is the n0th smallest cost.
The equilibrium of the collaboration game is as follows.
Theorem 1 (Collaboration under Complete Information):
Recall that Cn0 is the n0-th smallest collaboration cost
among all N users. The collaboration game admits the
following unique pure strategy SPE.
• If V < n0Cn0 , then the master does not want to
initiate the collaboration in Stage I and sets R∗ = 0.
No user will become collaborator in Stage II.
• If V ≥ n0Cn0 , the master offers a reward R
∗ =
n0Cn0 in Stage I. In Stage II, every user i with
Ci ≤ Cn0 collaborates and obtains a nonnegative
payoff Cn0 − Ci, and the remaining N − n0 users
decline to collaborate and get a zero payoff. The
profit of the master is V − n0Cn0 .
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix A.
We can show that users will not benefit from using
a mixed-strategy. But this may not be the case with
symmetrically incomplete information.
2.3 Collaboration under Symmetrically Incomplete
Information
Nowwe consider the symmetrically incomplete informa-
tion scenario, where both the master and the users only
8. We consider that each user will join the collaboration as long as
his payoff is nonnegative. Yet our results can still be generalized to the
case where users have positive reserve payoffs.
5know the cumulative probability distribution function
F (·) of the collaboration costs with the mean µ.9 A user
i even does not know the precise value of his own cost
Ci.10 In this case, we can view all users as homogeneous.
2.3.1 Analysis of Stage II
It turns out that there are multiple equilibria of the
collaboration game in Stage II as follows.
Theorem 2: (Stage II under Symmetrically Incomplete In-
formation): Stage II admits the following Nash equilibria:
• (No collaboration): If R < n0µ, no user will collabo-
rate at any equilibrium in Stage II.
• (Pure strategy NE): If n0µ ≤ R < Nµ (where Nµ
is the product of user number N and the mean µ
of user cost distribution), n∗ = ⌊Rµ ⌋ users choose
to collaborate and the remaining users decline. A
subset of n∗-out-of-N users is randomly picked up
among
(
N
n∗
)
possible subsets. Thus there exist
multiple pure NEs in this case.11 If R ≥ Nµ, all N
users will collaborate.
• (Mixed strategy NE): If n0µ < R < Nµ, every
user collaborates with a probability p∗, which is the
unique solution to
Em
((
R
m+ 1
− µ
)
1{m+1≥n0}
)
= 0, (3)
where the expectation E is taken over the random
variable m which follows a binomial distribution
B(N − 1, p).
The proof of no collaboration and pure strategy NE
are given in Appendix B.
We note that the pure and mixed strategy equilibria
in Theorem 2 share a common parameter range, n0µ <
R < Nµ. It should also be noted that the master is not
interested in selecting a certain NE since all NEs give
him the same performance. Furthermore, Theorem 3 will
show that the master will not encourage any mixed NE
at the first place.
Next we show how the mixed strategy NE p∗ is derived.
As all users have the same statistical information, we
will focus on the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium.
Assume that all users collaborate with a probability p.
Consider that there are m users (other than i) who
collaborate. If user i collaborates, his expected payoff is
u(R, p) := Em
((
R
m+ 1
− µ
)
1{m+1≥n0}
)
,
9. The master can estimate F (·) by learning from his collaboration
history or making a customer survey. A user can estimate F (·) by
checking his or other users’ collaboration experiences. There are many
public sources (e.g., the master’s or some third party’s market or
customer surveys) that help a user’s cost estimation [6], [16].
10. It is sometimes difficult for a user to know his precise loss of
privacy before an actual security threat happens to him. Users may
face many possible security threats by losing sensitive information,
e.g., direct property loss or advertising harassment.
11. How to select one NE is out of the scope of this paper, and can
be referred to [33]. Yet it should be noted that all pure strategy Nash
equilibria lead to the same performance for the master as shown in
Theorem 3 later on.
where the expectation is taken over m which follows a
binomial distribution B(N − 1, p), and is independent of
user i’s decision.
Given all the other N − 1 users collaborate with the
equilibrium probability p∗, user i’s payoffs by choosing
to collaborate or not are the same. Thus p∗ should satisfy
u(R, p∗) = 0,
and is a function of R. Thus we can rewrite p∗ as p∗(R).
One can show that there exists a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium p∗(R) ∈ (0, 1) as long as n0µ < R < Nµ.
Note that R ≤ n0µ leads to p
∗(R) = 0, which is not a
mixed strategy. Also, R ≥ Nµ leads to p∗(R) = 1, which
is not a mixed strategy either.
2.3.2 Analysis of Stage I
First we consider the case where users use the mixed
strategy in Theorem 2 and collaborate with probability
p∗(R). The master’s expected profit is then
f(R) := En
(
(V −R)1{n≥n0}
)
,
where the expectation is taken over n which follows
a binomial distribution (N, p∗(R)). One can show that
f(R) has a unique maximum f(R∗), which is positive
when V > n0µ. However, under n0µ < R < Nµ there
is always a chance that there are less than n0 users
choosing to collaborate under the mixed strategy. Thus
the master may want to avoid this. Theorem 2 shows
that by choosing R = n0µ, the master can guarantee n0
collaborators with a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in
Stage II. Any reward value lower than n0µ leads to no
collaboration, and any value larger than n0µ involves
a number of collaborators that is larger than necessary
(in a pure strategy NE) or does not guarantee enough
collaborators (in a mixed strategy NE). As the master’s
payoff decreases in reward given enough collaborators,
we have the following result.
Theorem 3: (Stage I under Symmetrically Incomplete In-
formation:) The collaboration game admits the following
unique SPE.
• If V < n0µ, the master will not initiate the collabo-
ration and will choose R∗ = 0.
• If V ≥ n0µ, the master will announce a reward R∗ =
n0µ. A set of n0 users will collaborate in Stage II.
The collaborators achieve a zero expected payoff,
and the master achieves a profit V − n0µ.
2.4 Collaboration under Asymmetrically Incomplete
Information
In this subsection, we study the case where each user i
knows his own exact cost Ci, but not other users’ costs.
The master only knows F (·).12
12. This is possible when users already learn about their private costs
over time, yet the master may not be able to track and collect these
sensitive information.
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2.4, and 2.8, respectively.
2.4.1 Analysis of Stage II
We have the following result for Stage II.
Theorem 4: (Stage II under Asymmetrically Incomplete
Information): A user i will collaborate if and only if
Ci ≤ γ∗(R). The common equilibrium decision threshold
γ∗(R) is the unique solution of Φ(γ) = 0, where
Φ(γ) := Em
((
R
m+ 1
− γ
)
1{m+1≥n0}
)
, (4)
and the expectation is taken over m which follows a
binomial distribution B(N − 1, F (γ)). The equilibrium
γ∗(R) satisfies RN < γ
∗(R) < Rn0 .
13
As (4) is independent of Ci when each user i makes
his decision, all users have the same decision threshold.
The intuition is that each user has the same information
and estimation about others. But different users would
still make different decisions as their private information
about their own collaboration costs are different.
To see why Stage II has the pure NE in Theorem 4,
we consider that all users other than i collaborate if and
only if their costs are less than some threshold γ > 0. If
user i collaborates, his payoff is(
R
m+ 1
− Ci
)
1{m+1≥n0},
where m follows a binomial distribution B(N − 1, F (γ))
and represents the number of users (other than i) who
collaborate. (Recall that cdf F (γ) = P (Ci ≤ γ).) Accord-
ingly, the expected payoff of user i if he collaborates is
Em
((
R
m+ 1
− Ci
)
1{m+1≥n0}
)
, (5)
and zero otherwise. At the Nash equilibrium, (5) should
equal to 0 when Ci = γ. That is, having the common
collaboration threshold γ is a Nash equilibrium if and
only if Φ(γ) = 0. We denote the solution to Φ(γ) = 0 in
13. We can also show that a user will not be better off by changing
from the current pure strategy to any mixed strategy.
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Fig. 3. Master’s expected profit f(R) as a function of R and N .
Other parameters are n0 = 30 and V = 100. Also, we consider
a uniform cost distribution with F (γ) = min(γ/3, 1). The optimal
reward values for differentN values (in ascending order) are 77,
52, and 40, respectively.
(4) as γ∗(R). In Appendix C, we prove that there always
exists a unique γ∗(R), which satisfies RN < γ
∗(R) < Rn0 .
Figure 2 shows Φ(γ) as a function of both γ and R.
The solution γ∗(R) to Φ(γ) = 0 is always unique and
satisfies RN < γ
∗(R) < Rn0 . When R = 100, for example,
we have γ∗(R) = 2, which is larger than R/N = 1 and is
smaller than R/n0 = 2.5. It is also interesting to notice
that all users share the same decision threshold γ∗(R)
although they have different costs.
Theorem 5: The equilibrium decision threshold γ∗(R)
increases in R, and decreases in N and n0.
The proof of Theorem 5 is given in Appendix D.
As N or n0 increases, more users need to participate
in the collaboration and thus the shared reward per
collaborator decreases. Therefore, the decision threshold
decreases and each user is less likely to collaborate.
2.4.2 Analysis of Stage I
We are now ready to consider Stage I. Given users’ equi-
librium strategies based on threshold γ∗(R) in Stage II
in Theorem 4, the master chooses reward R to maximize
his expected profit, i.e.,
max
R
f(R) = En
(
(V −R)1{n≥n0}
)
, (6)
where the expectation is taken over n which follows a
binomial distribution B(N,F (γ∗(R))). A smaller reward
R leads to a larger value of V − R, but decreases the
collaboration success probability P (n ≥ n0;R).
Let us denote the master’s equilibrium choice of re-
ward in Stage I as R∗, which is the optimal solution
to Problem (6). To solve Problem (6), we can use any
one-dimensional exhaustive search algorithm to find the
global optimal solution. Next we verify that the com-
putation complexity is not high. We can approximate
the continuity of the feasible range [0, V ] of reward
R through a proper discretization, i.e., representing all
possibilities of R by V¯ equally spaced values (with the
first and last values equal to 0 and V , respectively).
7Fig. 4. Master’s equilibrium rewardR∗ as a function of variance
δ and n0. Other parameters are N = 80, V = 210, and µ = 3.
Since the user decision threshold γ∗(R) for each possible
value of reward R belongs to the range [0, V ] (due to
γ∗(R) ≤ R and R ≤ V ), we can similarly discretize
this continuous range of γ∗(R) by V¯ possible values.
To derive γ∗(R) for each possible R value, we need to
search over all V¯ possibiliites of γ∗(R) to apprximately
solve Φ = 0 in (4), and to derive the optimal R∗ we need
to further search over all V¯ possilities of R, and thus
the overall computation complexity to solve Problem
(6) is O(V¯ 2). The choice of V¯ depends on the master’s
tolerance level of the quantization error, and a larger
V¯ value leads to a more accurate solution with more
computation overhead.
Theorem 6: The equilibrium expected profit f(R∗) of
the master increases in V and N , and decreases in n0.
The proof of Theorem 6 is given in Appendix E.
Similarly, we can show that the optimal reward R∗
increases in V and n0, and decreases in N .
As the master’s revenue V increases, he benefits more
from the collaboration. As the threshold n0 increases,
however, each user is less likely to collaborate. Thus the
master has to give a larger total reward to attract enough
collaborators. This decreases his equilibrium expected
profit.
Figure 3 shows that the master’s expected profit f(R)
as a function of R and N . We can see that both f(R)
and the equilibrium f(R∗) = maxR f(R) are increasing
in N . Intuitively, as N increases, more users have small
collaboration costs (as the cdf function F (·) does not
change), and more users will collaborate under the same
total reward. Thus the master can lower the equilibrium
reward R∗ and obtain a larger expected profit.
Next we study how the master’s equilibrium total
reward and expected profit change with the cdf function
F (·) of a user’s collaboration cost. We pick Gaussian
distribution for example, which can be explicitly charac-
terized by mean µ and variance δ only. This is the case
where the master aggregates his cost observations over
Fig. 5. Master’s equilibrium expected profit f(R∗) as a function
of variance δ and n0. Other parameters are N = 80, V = 210
and µ = 3.
a large number of user samples.14
Observation 1: The master’s equilibrium total reward
R∗ increases in mean µ (and his expected profit decreases
in µ). Moreover, the optimal reward R∗ increases in
variance δ for large n0 and decreases in δ for small n0.
The relationship between R∗ and µ is quite intuitive,
as the master needs to decide a larger R∗ to compensate
each collaborator’s increased cost in expected sense. We
next elaborate the impact of δ on R∗.
Figure 4 shows R∗ as a function of variance δ and n0,
where the master with smaller n0 requirement can effi-
ciently build the database with smaller reward R∗. When
the master requires a large n0, he needs to incentivize
most users to join the collaboration. As δ increases, some
users are more likely to realize much larger costs than
µ and the conservative master still needs to incentivize
them. Thus R∗ increases in δ in this case. When the
master only requires a small n0, he can target at those
users with smallest costs. As δ increases, these users are
more likely to have much smaller costs than µ and the
master only needs to decide smaller R∗ to incentivize
them.
We can similarly show in Fig. 5 that as δ increases,
the master with large n0 requirement obtains smaller
expected profit f(R∗), whereas the master with small
n0 requirement obtains larger f(R
∗). Notice that f(R∗)
decreases in requirement n0, which is consistent with
Theorem 6.
As the users’ costs are random variables and have dif-
ferent realizations in different time slots, we explore how
the master’s equilibrium realized profit changes with
time and cost variance δ in the newly added Fig. 6 when
the contributor threshold n0 = 55. Notice that for each δ
value, the optimal reward R∗ is determined to maximize
expected profit based on users’ cost distributions, and
does not depend on the cost realizations in each time
slot. The realized profit is either V −R∗ or 0, depending
on whether the collaboration is successful in that time
14. Note that the following results also apply to uniform distribution,
and we skip the discussion here due to the page limit.
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Fig. 6. Master’s equilibrium realized profit in time horizon. Other
parameters are N = 80, V = 210, n0 = 55 and µ = 3.
slot (i.e., n ≥ n0) according to (6). As δ increases, the
master’s realized profit in Fig. 6 decreases most of the
time (except time slots 3 and 14). This is consistent with
the result in Fig. 5 regarding the equilibrium expected
profit when n0 = 55. Furthermore, Fig. 6 shows that
a larger variation δ leads to more fluctuations of the
mater’s realized profit. This means that when n0 is large,
the master prefers a smaller cost variation in order to
have a larger realized profit in most of the time slots.
When n0 is small (e.g., n0 = 15), we can show that
(through a figure of a similar style as Fig. 6) that the
master prefers a larger cost variation instead. We do not
include the small n0 case here due to the space limit.
By comparing the performances of the master and
users under complete information, symmetrically in-
complete information, and asymmetrically incomplete
information, we have the following result.
Theorem 7: At the equilibrium of the collaboration
game, the master obtains the smallest expected profit
under asymmetrically incomplete information, whereas
the users obtain the smallest (zero) expected payoffs
under symmetrically incomplete information.
Theorem 7 shows that the users benefit from knowing
their own costs, while the master incurs profit loss when
the users know their costs and can hide the information
from the master.
Recall that the master obtains an expected profit V −
n0µ under symmetrically incomplete information, and
obtains a profit V − n0C0 under complete information.
The relation between these two values depends on N ,
n0, and F (·). Take the uniform distribution F (·) as an
example. If n0 is much smaller than N/2, the expected
value of C0 will be smaller than µ and the master is
better off under complete information.
3 COLLABORATIONS ON DISTRIBUTED COM-
PUTING
3.1 System Model on Distributed Computation
In this type of applications, the master solicits the col-
laboration of smartphone users to perform distributed
computing.15 Different from requiring fixed and periodic
data reporting as in data acquisition applications, the
master here can assign different amounts of work to
different user types. Smartphones are generally different
in terms of CPU performance, memory and storage,
battery life, and connectivity [18]. Even with the same
smartphones, two users may have different phone usage
behaviors and different sensitivities (e.g., energy con-
sumption).
One can imagine that the energy consumption will
hinder the smartphones’ involvement in distributed
computing, which motivates us to consider smart-
phones’ energy constraints (i.e., battery capacity limits)
in the modeling of t¯i in (8). Meanwhile, we want to
highlight that it is already feasible for smartphones to
support distributed computing. First, the large number
of smartphones can help compensate the energy limi-
tation of each individual phone [12]. Then the energy
consumed by an individual smartphone is not large.
Second, the energy limitation will be of a less concern
for smartphones which have access to charging facilities
(as the reviewer has pointed out). With the newly de-
veloped wireless charging technologies (e.g., inductive
and magnetic resonance couplings), more smartphones
can be supported even when they are moving around
[34]. Third, the battery technologies and energy man-
agement algorithms have been significantly improved
during the recently years (e.g., [13], [14]). Finally, today’s
data storage technologies make it possible to store tens of
gigabytes of data in a small memory card, which means
that some of today’s smartphones are almost as capable
as desktop computers from several years back [35].
We consider a total of N users belonging to a set
I = {1, · · · , I} of I types. Each type i ∈ I has Ni ≥ 1
users, with
∑
i∈I Ni = N . A type-i user can perform
at most t¯i units of work, and faces a cost Ki per unit
of work he performs. The upper bound of t¯i reflects
the limited battery capacity, time constraint, or other
physical constraints. Users know their unit costs be-
fore the collaboration, since (i) many factors of these
costs (e.g., power consumption) are explicitly reflected
by smartphones’ technical specifications, and (ii) users
explicitly know their own sensitivities (e.g., to power
consumption) in costs. Note that the data exchanged
between users and the master are not sensitive to users.
This is different from data acquisition, where costs also
come from implicit insecurity. To determine the unit
cost values, one can check [29] and [30] for energy
consumption data (e.g., radio power in joul per minute)
in specific applications.
The payoff of a type-i user who accomplishes t units
of work and receives a reward r from the master is
ui(r, t) = r −Kit, for 0 ≤ t ≤ t¯i. (7)
15. PCs are also suitable to handle distributed computing given a
lot more power. Our results here can also be applicable for those PCs
which are underutilized and can connect to Internet for networking.
9Note that the user can always choose not to collabo-
rate with the master and thus receive zero payoff with
t = r = 0.16 Without loss of generality, we order
user types in the descending order of the unit cost, i.e.,
K1 > K2 > ... > KI , i.e., a higher type of user has a
smaller cost. Note that if any two types have the same
unit cost, we can group them together as a single type. It
should also be mentioned that this unit-cost ordering is
different from the way that we order smartphone users’
constant collaboration costs in Section 2.
By asking each type-i user to accomplish the amount
ti of work and rewarding him with ri, the master’s profit
is17
pi({(ri, ti)}i∈I) =
∑
i∈I
(θi log(1 +Niti)−Niri) . (8)
The term θi log(1 + Niti) is increasing in users’ efforts
and well characterizes the master’s diminishing return
(or utility) from the total work Niti finished by type-i
(as in [36], [37]).18 The parameter θi > 0 characterizes the
master’s preference for work performed by type-i users,
and does not depend on Ki.19 Notice that we do not
require θi’s to be monotonically ordered. The term Niri
in (8) is the total reward that the master offers to type-i
users. The summation operation in (8) is motivated by
the fact that many complex engineering or commercial
problems can be separated into multiple subproblems
and solved in a distributed manner (e.g., [14], [20]).
By examining (7) and (8), we can see that the master
and users have conflicting objectives. The master wants
users to accomplish a larger task, which increases the
master’s utility as well as users’ collaboration costs.
Users want to obtain a larger reward, which decreases
the master’s profit. Next we study how master and users
interact through a contract.
3.2 Master-Users Contractual Interactions
Contract theory studies how an economic decision-
maker constructs contractual arrangements, especially in
the presence of asymmetric (private) information [24]. In
our case, the user types are private information.
The master proposes a contract that specifies the rela-
tionship between a user’s amount of task t and reward r.
16. Note that rewards and tasks are related in a properly designed
contract, and one would expect that the reward increases with the
corresponding task amount. We will analytically characterize such a
relationship later on.
17. Here the summation operation is taken outside the logarithmic
terms, as it is hard to coordinate different user types (in operation
systems, computing speeds, and storage capabilities) in the same
computing task due to compatibility and synchronization issues and
they will be responsible for different tasks at the same time.
18. The assumed logarithmic utility term helps us derive closed-form
solutions and engineering insights. Using other concave terms with
diminished return are not likely to change the main conclusions.
19. The value of θi depends on how easily the master can combine
the computing efforts of this type with other types’ efforts to finalize
the computing result. Notice that θi is large if the master’s communica-
tion with type-i users is efficient (e.g., with small delay) or the type-i’s
operation system becomes highly compatible with the master’s system
to handle computing tasks.
Specifically, a contract is a set C = {(t1, r1), . . . , (tM , rM )}
of M ≥ 1 (amount of task, reward)-pairs that are called
contract items. The master proposes C. Each user selects a
contract item (tm, rm) and performs the amount of work
tm for the reward rm. According to [24], it is optimal for
the master to design a contract item for each type, i.e.,
M = I . Note that a user can always choose not to work
for the master, which implies an implicit contract item
(r, t) = (0, 0) (often not counted in the total number of
contract items). Once a user accepts some contract item,
he needs to accomplish the task and the master needs to
reward him according to that item.
Each type of users selects the contract item that max-
imizes his payoff in (7). The master wants to optimize
the contract items and maximize his profit in (8). We will
again focus on a two-stage Stackelberg game, where the
master proposes the contract first and users choose the
contract items afterwards.
Next, we study how the master determines the con-
tract that maximizes his profit, depending on what infor-
mation he has about the users’ types. As explained in the
beginning of Section 3.1, we assume that a user knows
his unit cost. This means that we only need to consider
two information scenarios, complete information and
asymmetrically incomplete information, depending on
what the master knows.
3.3 Contract Design under Complete Information
In this subsection, we study the case where the master
knows the type of each user though this case is not
easy to realize in practice. The analysis of this subsection
mainly serves as a benchmark for understanding the
more realistic incomplete information scenario in next
subsection. Under complete information, it is feasible for
the master to monitor and make sure that each type of
users accepts only the contract item designed for that
type. The master needs to ensure that each user has
a non-negative payoff so that the user will accept the
contract. In other words, the contract should satisfy the
following individual rationality constraints.
Definition 1 (IR: Individual Rationality): A contract sat-
isfies the individual rationality constraints if each type-
i user receives a non-negative payoff by accepting the
contract item for type-i, i.e.,20
ri −Kiti ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I. (9)
20. We can easily extend our model by considering a reservation
payoff u0 > 0 for all users, which represents their benefit by making
an alternative choice besides joining in the collaboration. By following
a similar analysis, we can still show that the new IR constraints ri −
Kiti ≥ u0 are tight at the contract optimality for any type-i user
who joins in the collaboration. The key difference is that the master
now needs to match users’ reservation payoffs by announcing larger
rewards, which is slightly different from Theorem 8.
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Under complete information, the optimal contract C =
{(r∗i , t
∗
i )}i∈I solves the following problem:
max
{(ri,ti)}i∈I
pi({(ri, ti)}i∈I) =
∑
i∈I
(θi log(1 +Niti)−Niri),
subject to: IR constraints (9) and 0 ≤ ti ≤ t¯i, ∀i ∈ I.
(10)
It is easy to check that the IR constraints are tight at
the optimal solution to Problem (10), and the master will
leave a zero payoff to each type-i user with r∗i = Kit
∗
i .
Also, due to the independence of each type in Problem
(10), we can decompose Problem (10) into I subprob-
lems. For each type i ∈ I, the master needs to solve the
following subproblem
max
ti
pii(ti) = θi log(1 +Niti)−NiKiti,
subject to: 0 ≤ ti ≤ t¯i. (11)
By solving all I subproblems, we have the following
result.
Theorem 8 (Optimal Contract under Complete Information):
At the equilibrium, the master will hire the type-i users
if and only if θi > Ki. The total involved user type set
is
IC = {i ∈ I : θi > Ki}. (12)
The subscript C in IC refers to the complete information
assumption. For a user with type i ∈ IC , the equilibrium
contract item is
(r∗i , t
∗
i ) = (Kit
∗
i , t
∗
i )
=
(
min
(
θi −Ki
Ni
,Kit¯i
)
,min
(
θi −Ki
KiNi
, t¯i
))
. (13)
For a user with type i /∈ IC , the equilibrium contract
item is (r∗i , t
∗
i ) = (0, 0). All users (no matter joining
collaboration or not) receive a zero payoff. The master’s
equilibrium profit is
pi∗ =
∑
i∈IC
min
(
θi log
(
θi
Ki
)
− θi +Ki, θi log(1 +Ni t¯i)−NiKi t¯i
)
.
(14)
The proof of Theorem 8 is given in Appendix G.
Intuitively, the master needs to compensate a collabo-
rator’s cost, thus he will hire type-i users only when his
preference characteristic θi is larger than the unit cost of
that type Ki. Users will receive a zero payoff since their
private information about unit costs are known to the
master.
By looking into all parameters in the equilibrium
contract in (13) and payoff pi∗ in (14), we have the
following observation.
Observation 2: For i ∈ IC , the equilibrium task t∗i to a
type-i user increases in θi, and decreases in Ni and Ki.
The master may or may not offer a larger task or reward
to a higher type-i collaborator, depending on Ni and θi
for that type. Also, the master’s equilibrium profit pi∗
increases in θi, Ni, and t¯i, and decreases in Ki.
Notice that a higher type-i collaborator has less unit
cost where the master needs to compensate, but the
master may not give him a larger task or reward. This
can happen when there are too many collaborators of
that type, or the master evaluates this type with a small
value of θi.
3.4 Master’s Contract Design under Asymmetrically
Incomplete Information
In this subsection, we study the case where the master
only has asymmetrically incomplete information about
each user’s type. A user’s actual type is only known to
himself, and the master and the other users only have a
rough estimation on this. We consider that others believe
a user belonging to type-iwith a probability qi. Everyone
knows the total number of users N .21
3.4.1 Feasibility of contract under asymmetrically in-
complete information
According to [24], the master’s contract should first be
feasible in this scenario. A feasible contract must satisfy
both individual rationality (IR) constraints (Definition 1
in Section 3.3) and incentive compatibility constraints
defined as follows.
Definition 2 (IC: Incentive Compatibility): A contract
satisfies the incentive compatibility constraints if each
type-i user prefers to choose the contract item for his
own type, i.e.,
ri −Kiti ≥ rj −Kitj , ∀i, j ∈ I. (15)
Under asymmetrically incomplete information, the
master does not know the number of users Ni of type-
i. Let us denote the users’ numbers of all types as
{ni}i∈I , which are random variables following certain
distributions and satisfying
∑
i∈I ni = N . Note that the
realizations of {ni}i∈I depend on N and probabilities
{qi}i∈I of all types that a user may belong to. The
master’s profit for a particular realization of {ni}i∈I is
pi({(ri, ti)}i∈I , {ni}i∈I) =
∑
i∈I
(θi log(1 + niti)− niri).
(16)
Thus the master’s expected profit is
E{ni}i∈I [pi({(ri, ti)}i∈I , {ni}i∈I)]
=
N∑
n1=0
N−n1∑
n2=0
...
N−
∑I−2
j=1
nj∑
nI−1=0
N !qn11 ...q
nI−1
I−1 q
N−
∑I−1
j=1
nj
I
n1!...nI−1!(N −
∑I−1
j=1 nj)!
· pi({(ri, ti)}i∈I , {ni}i∈I). (17)
21. Users can knowN by checking the master’s or some third party’s
market survey, or the news on recent penetration or shipment of
smartphones.
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The master’s profit optimization problem as22
max
{(ri,ti)}i∈I
E{ni}i∈I [pi({(ri, ti)}i∈I , {ni}i∈I)]
subject to: IR constraints in (9),
IC constraints in (15),
0 ≤ ti ≤ t¯i, ∀i ∈ I. (18)
The total number of IR and IC constraints is I2. Next, we
show that it is possible to represent these I2 constraints
with a set of much fewer equivalent constraints.
Proposition 1: (Sufficient and Necessary Conditions for fea-
sibility): For a contract C = {(ri, ti), ∀i ∈ I} with user
costs K1 > ... > KI , it is feasible if and only if all the
following conditions are satisfied:
1) Condition(+): r1 −K1t1 ≥ 0;
2) Condition(↑): 0 ≤ r1 ≤ ... ≤ rI and 0 ≤ t1 ≤ ... ≤
tK ;
3) Condition(≤): For any i = 2, ..., I ,
ri−1 +Ki(ti − ti−1) ≤ ri ≤ ri−1 +Ki−1(ti − ti−1).
(19)
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in Appendix H.
Intuitively, Condition(+) ensures that all types of
users can get a nonnegative payoff by accepting the
contract item (r1, t1), as it implies r1 − Kjt1 ≥ 0 for
all j ≥ 2. Thus this can replace the IR constraints
in (9). Condition(↑) and Condition(≤) are related to
IC constraints in (15). Condition(↑) shows that a user
with a higher type should be assigned a larger task,
because his unit cost is lower (and more efficient) and
the master needs to compensate this user less per unit
work. Also, a larger reward should be given to this user
for the larger task undertaken by him, otherwise this
user will choose another contract item in order to work
less. Condition(≤) shows the relation between any two
neighboring contract items.
Based on Proposition 1, we can simplify the master’s
problem in (18) as
max
{(ri,ti)}i∈I
E{ni}i∈I [pi({(ri, ti)}i∈I , {ni}i∈I)]
subject to, Condition(+), Condition(↑), Condition(≤),
0 ≤ ti ≤ t¯i, ∀i ∈ I, (20)
where the previous I2 IR and IC constraints have been
reduced to I + 2 constraints.
3.4.2 Analysis by sequential optimization
Now we want to solve the master’s optimal contract.
However, (20) is not easy to solve as it has coupled
variables and many constraints. The way we solve is a
sequential optimization approach: we first derive the op-
timal rewards {r∗i ({ti}i∈I)}i∈I given any feasible tasks
{ti}i∈I , then further derive the optimal tasks {t
∗
i }i∈I for
the optimal contract.
22. After observing all I reward-task combinations in {(ri, ti)}i∈I ,
it is optimal for any type-i user to choose only (ri, ti) of his own type
later, according to IR and IC constraints in the contract mechanism.
Proposition 2: Let C = {(ri, ti)}i∈I be a feasible con-
tract with any feasible tasks 0 ≤ t1 ≤ ... ≤ tI . The unique
optimal rewards {r∗i ({ti}i∈I)}i∈I satisfy
r∗1 ({ti}i∈I) = K1t1, (21)
r∗i ({ti}i∈I) = r
∗
i−1 +Ki(ti − ti−1)
= K1t1 +
i∑
j=2
Kj(tj − tj−1), ∀i = 2, ..., I, (22)
Notice that the lowest type user obtains a zero payoff,
and a user’s optimal payoff is non-decreasing in his type.
Proof (Sketch): First, we can prove (21) by showing
that Condition(+) binds at the optimality. This guaran-
tees the IR constraints of the contract. Second, we can
prove (22) by showing that the left-hand side inequality
in Condition(≤) binds at the optimality. This guarantees
the IC constraints of the contract. Finally, (21) shows a
zero payoff for the lowest type user, and (22) shows that
for any {ti}Ii=1,
r∗i −Kiti = r
∗
i−1 −Kiti−1,
which is no smaller than r∗i−1 − Ki−1ti−1 due to Ki <
Ki−1. Thus a user’s payoff is non-decreasing in his type.
Based on Proposition 2, we can greatly simplify the
master’s optimization Problem in (20) as
max
{ti}i∈I
E{ni}i∈I [pi({(r
∗
i ({ti}i∈I), ti)}, {ni}i∈I)]
subject to, 0 ≤ t1 ≤ ... ≤ tI ,
ti ≤ t¯i, ∀i ∈ I. (23)
Next we first examine whether Problem (23) is a
convex problem and then derive a way to solve it. The
first derivative of the master’s expected profit over ti is
∂E{ni}i∈I [pi({(r
∗
i ({ti}i∈I), ti)}, {ni}i∈I)]
∂ti
=
N∑
n1=0
N−n1∑
n2=0
...
N−
∑I−2
j=1
nj∑
nI−1=0
N !qn11 ...q
nI−1
I−1 q
N−
∑I−1
j=1
nj
I
n1!...nI−1!(N −
∑I−1
j=1 nj)!
 niθi
1 + niti
− niKi − (Ki −Ki+1)
∑
∀j>i,∀j∈I
nj

 , ∀i ∈ I,
(24)
which is independent of tj for any j 6= i. From (24),
we can easily check the Hessian matrix of the objective
function in Problem (23) and conclude that it is concave
in {ti, i ∈ I}. Furthermore, the constraints in Problem
(23) are all linear and the feasible set in Problem (23) is
convex and not empty. Thus we conclude that Problem
(23) is convex. It should be noted that the feasible set of
Problem (23) has interior such that the strick inequalities
hold for all constraints in Problem (23). For example, for
any positive value η, such an interior point feasible for
Problem (23) could be
ti =
min({t¯i, ∀i ∈ I})
I − i+ 1 + η
, ∀i ∈ I.
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Thus Problem (23) is a convex problem satisfying Slater’s
condition (implying strong duality) and always has a
solution, and can be optimally solved by examining KKT
conditions.
The Lagrangian function is
L({ti, i ∈ I}, {λi, i ∈ I \ {I}}, {vi, i ∈ I})
= E{ni}i∈I [pi({(r
∗
i ({ti}i∈I), ti)}, {ni}i∈I)] +
∑
i∈I
vi(t¯i − ti)
+
∑
i∈I\{I}
λi(ti+1 − ti), (25)
where {λi, i ∈ I \ {I}} and {vi, i ∈ I} are Lagrange
multipliers corresponding to the constraints in Problem
(23). The KKT conditions are as follows.
• Primal constraints: t∗i ≤ t
∗
i+1, ∀i ∈ I \{I}; t
∗
i ≤ t¯i, ∀i ∈
I;
• Dual constraints: λ∗i ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I\{I}, and v
∗
i ≥ 0, ∀i ∈
I;
• Complementary slackness: λ∗i (t
∗
i+1 − t
∗
i ) = 0, ∀i ∈ I \
{I}, and v∗i (t¯i − t
∗
i ) = 0, ∀i ∈ I;
• First-order condition of Lagrangian with respect to ti:
∂L/∂t1 =∂E{ni}i∈I [pi({(r
∗
i ({ti}i∈I), ti)}, {ni}i∈I)]/∂t1
− λ1 − v1 = 0,
∂L/∂ti =∂E{ni}i∈I [pi({(r
∗
i ({ti}i∈I), ti)}, {ni}i∈I)]/∂ti
− (λi − λi−1)− vi = 0, ∀i ∈ I \ {1, I},
∂L/∂tI =∂E{ni}i∈I [pi({(r
∗
i ({ti}i∈I), ti)}, {ni}i∈I)]/∂tI
+ λI−1 − vI = 0, (26)
from which we cannot derive closed-form solutions
but can rely on numerical methods (e.g., primal
dual algorithm) to show numerical results later
on.23 The computation complexity to solve Problem
(23) is not high and the complexity upperbound
can be derived in the following way. Due to the
task relationships among different user types (i.e.,
t1 ≤ ... ≤ tI and tI ≤ t¯I ), the possible range of each
task ti is [0, t¯I ]. We can approximate the continuity
of this range through a proper discretization, i.e.,
representing all possibilities of any ti by T equally
spaced values (with the first and last values equal to
0 and t¯I , respectively). By (approximately) solving
all the KKT conditions especially (26) above, we
require computation in order O(T ) to search over
all T possibilities for each optimal t∗i for type-i. The
overall computation complexity for all I types is
O(I · T ) in Problem (23). The choice of T will affect
the quantization error of the computation.
Actually, without explicitly solving Problem (23), we
can still derive some interesting results by looking into
the KKT conditions as follows.
23. It should be mentioned that some multiplier λi (corresponding
to the constraint ti+1 ≥ ti) may be nonzero when the master has much
smaller preference characteristics on higher user type-(i+1) than type-
i, or the higher type involves many more users than the lower type.
Some multiplier vi (corresponding to ti ≤ t¯i) may be nonzero when
the capacity upper bound t¯i of type-i is small.
Fig. 7. The master’s optimal contract items for three types
(I=3). Other parameters are N = 120, K1 = 1.5, K2 = 1,
K3 = 0.5, θi = 5, and qi = 1/3 for any i ∈ I.
Theorem 9: The total involved user type set under
asymmetrically incomplete information is
IA = {i ∈ I :
E{ni}i∈I [ni(θi −Ki)− (Ki −Ki+1)
∑
∀j>i,j∈I
nj] > 0}, (27)
where the subscript A in IA refers to the asymmetrically
incomplete information assumption.24 Compared with
the collaborator set IC under complete information case,
here the master involves less collaborators, i.e., |IA| ≤
|IC |. Moreover, the master assigns a larger task and gives
a larger reward to a higher type of collaborator, which
may not be the case under complete information (see
Observation 2). Only the lowest type of collaborator(s)
in set IA obtains a zero payoff, and higher types of
collaborators in set IA obtain positive payoffs that are
increasing in their types.
The proof of Theorem 9 is given in Appendix I.
Intuitively, as the master does not know each user’s
type, he needs to provide incentives (in terms of positive
payoffs) to the users to attract them revealing their own
types truthfully. If he involves a low type user, he needs
to give increasingly higher payoffs to all higher types.
Thus he should target at users with high enough types.
We have |IA| smaller than |IC |, which means that some
low types belong to set IC may not be included in set
IA. By comparing (27) and (12) for the highest type-I , we
know that that this type is involved in both information
scenarios.
Recall that under complete information, Observation 2
shows that the master may not give a larger task and
reward to a higher type-i collaborator. This can happen
when θi is small or the number of users of that type
is large. Under asymmetrically incomplete information,
however, the IC constraints require the reward and task
to be nondecreasing in the collaborator types, indepen-
24. Note that the master will design (r∗, t∗) = (0, 0) for the types
not in set IA. Thus the users of these types are not involved as
collaborators.
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Fig. 8. Users’ aggregate payoff under asymmetrically
incomplete information as a function of users’ realized
numbers {ni}3i=1 in three types (I=3). Here we only show
n1 and n3, and n2 can be computed as N−n1−n3. Other
parameters are N = 120, K1 = 1.1, K2 = 1, K3 = 0.9,
θi = 5, and qi = 1/3 for any i ∈ I.
dent of θi and the number of users in each type (which is
a random variable). Otherwise, some collaborators will
have incentives to choose contract items not designed for
their own types, and thus violate IC constraints. This
is not optimal for the master based on the Revelation
Principle [24].
Figure 7 shows the master’s optimal contract
{(r∗i , t
∗
i )}
3
i=1 for three collaborator types. A higher type-i
user obtains a larger task t∗i , a larger reward r
∗
i , and a
larger payoff (u∗i = r
∗
i −t
∗
i ). This is consistent with Propo-
sition 2. The slope of the dashed line between two points
(r∗i , t
∗
i ) and (r
∗
i+1, t
∗
i+1) equals to cost Ki+1 (as shown
in Proposition 2). In the contract, the ratio between the
reward and task (i.e., r∗i /t
∗
i ) for type-i decreases with
the type. Thus a lower type j < i collaborator will not
choose the higher contract item (r∗i , t
∗
i ), since it is too
costly and not be efficient for him to undertake the task.
A user will not choose a lower type contract item either,
otherwise his payoff (though still positive) will decrease
with a smaller reward.
By looking into (24), we have the following result.
Observation 3: The master’s optimal task allocation t∗i
to a type-i collaborator increases in the master’s pref-
erence characteristic θi and decreases in the collabora-
tor’s cost Ki. The master’s equilibrium expected profit
increases in θi for all i ∈ IA.
Given the task-reward combinations in the contract,
users will benefit from keeping their private information
from the master: the lowest type collaborator obtains a
zero payoff and a higher type one obtains a larger and
positive payoff as in Proposition 2 and Fig. 7. To un-
derstand how the hidden information benefits the entire
user population, Fig. 8 investigates users’ aggregate pay-
off as we vary the number of users of each of the three
types, {ni}3i=1. The total population is fixed at a size of
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Fig. 9. The ratio of the master’s realized payoffs under
asymmetrically incomplete and complete information as a
function of users’ realized numbers {ni}3i=1 in three types(I=3). Here we only show n1 and n2, and n3 equals N −
n1−n2. Other parameters are N = 120, K1 = 1.1, K2 = 1,
K3 = 0.9, θi = 5, and qi = 1/3 for any i ∈ I.
N = 120. We can see that the users’ aggregate payoff
decreases as we have more low type users (n1), and in-
creases as we have more high type users (n3). Intuitively,
a higher number of type-1 collaborators (n1) means that
more collaborators receive a zero payoff, while a higher
number of type-3 collaborators (n3) means that more
collaborators receive the maximum payoff.
It should be noted that the master prefers a large prob-
ability of having high type users, as these users are more
efficient in performing computing tasks given the same
reward. As an example, consider three types of users
(I = 3): the master enjoys the maximum collaboration
benefit when all users belong to the highest type (i.e.,
q1 = q2 = 0 and q3 = 1). This is also illustrated in Fig. 7,
where the ratio between task and reward (i.e., t∗i /r
∗
i ) is
the highest for the type-3 users. When all users always
belong to the same type, users cannot hide their type
information from the master, and the master can hire
them by just provding a zero payoff. However, when
users have positive probabilities of belonging to different
types, they can hide their type information from the
master, and the master needs to provide more rewards
to motivate high type users to contribute.
Next, we compare the master’s profits under complete
and asymmetrically incomplete information.
Observation 4: Compared with complete information,
the master obtains a smaller equilibrium expected profit
under asymmetrically incomplete information. The gap
between his realized profit under two information sce-
narios is minimized when the realization (users’ num-
bers in all types) is the closest to the expected value.
Figure 9 shows the ratio of the master’s realized
payoffs under asymmetrically incomplete and complete
information, which is a function of users’ realizations
{ni}
3
i=1 in all three types. This ratio is always no larger
than 1, as the master obtains the maximum profit un-
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der complete information. This profit ratio reaches its
maximum 92% when users’ type realization matches the
expected value, i.e., ni = Nqi = 40 for i = 1, 2 (and thus
n3 = N−n1−n2 = 40 as well). This is consistent with the
fact that the master maximize his expected profit under
asymmetrically incomplete information. Note that even
in this case, there is still a profit loss for the master under
asymmetrically incomplete information due to the loss
of information.
4 CONCLUSION
This paper analyzes different mechanisms that a master
can use to motivate the collaboration of smartphone
users on both data acquisition and distributed computing.
Our proposed incentive mechanisms cover several pos-
sible information scenarios that the master may face in
reality. For data acquisition applications, we propose
a reward-based collaboration scheme for the master to
attract enough users by giving out the minimum reward.
For distributed computing applications, we use contract
theory to study how a master decides different task-
reward combinations for many different types of users.
There are some possible ways to extend the results
in this paper. For the data acquisition applications, for
example, we can consider a flexible revenue model
instead of a threshold one. For example, Google can
still benefit if a few users take pictures of some critical
events. The master will still give out some reward even
facing a small number of users, and his reward and
profit would increase as more and more users choose
to collaborate. Moreover, in some network with small
number of users, the geographical positions of users
could be more important than the total number. We will
study such an spatial issue in the future.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
If V < n0C0, then the master’s announced total reward
R is also smaller than n0C0 to make a profit. This
reward is not enough to compensate even n0 users with
smallest costs, thus no users will join. Regarding this,
the ma ter will n t seek users’ collaboration in Stage I
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by announcing zero reward R∗ = 0. Next we focus on
V ≥ n0C0.
We first prove the existence of the equilibrium in The-
orem 1. In the strategies shown in Theorem 1, involved
users will not leave the collaboration since they have
non-negative payoffs. Also, those users not in the col-
laboration will not decide to collaborate, otherwise they
receive negative payoffs. The master will not deviate
by decreasing or increasing the R∗, otherwise he will
involve less than n0 users or loss profit, respectively.
We then prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium by
contradiction. Note that R∗ = n0C0 corresponds to a
unique state of users’ equilibrium decisions in Theo-
rem 1. Suppose there exists another equilibrium with
a different Rˆ∗ 6= R∗. If Rˆ∗ < R∗, the master cannot
attract enough collaborators and the collaboration is
not successful; if Rˆ∗ > R∗, the master has incentive
to decrease Rˆ∗ to R∗. Thus there does exist such an
equilibrium with Rˆ∗ 6= R∗.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF NO COLLABORATION AND PURE
STRATEGY NE IN THEOREM 2
We focus on users’ pure strategies where R is already
given. If R < n0µ, this reward cannot attract n0 collabo-
rators where each user’s collaboration cost is believed to
be µ. Thus the collaboration is not successful and no user
will collaborate in Stage II. Next we focus on R ≥ n0µ.
• If n0µ ≤ R < Nµ, we prove n∗ = ⌊
R
µ ⌋ by contra-
diction. Suppose there are n∗ 6= ⌊Rµ ⌋ collaborators at
the equilibrium.
– If n∗ < ⌊Rµ ⌋, then another user will join the
collaboration and receive nonnegative expected
payoff (nonnegative payoff Rn∗+1 − µ when col-
laboration is successful and zero payoff other-
wise).
– If n∗ > ⌊Rµ ⌋, then some involved user will
leave the collaboration since he receives nega-
tive expected payoff (negative payoff Rn∗ − µ if
the collaboration is successful and zero payoff
otherwise).
Thus there are n∗ = ⌊Rµ ⌋ collaborators at the equi-
librium.
• If R ≥ Nµ, each user can join the collaboration and
receive non-negative expected payoff and thus n∗ =
N .
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF
EQUILIBRIUM THRESHOLD IN THEOREM 4
Recall that Φ(γ) is given in (4). Here we want to prove
that there exists a unique solution γ∗(R) (or simply γ∗)
to Φ(γ) = 0, which satisfies RN < γ
∗ < Rn0 .
We divide the proof into the following three parts,
depending on relation between R and γ∗. For simplicity,
we represent F (γ∗) as F ∗.
• Suppose that there exists a solution γ∗ to Φ(γ) =
0 in (4) which satisfies R ≤ n0γ∗. Since Φ(γ∗) is
increasing in R, we have Φ(γ∗) ≤ Φ(γ∗) |R=n0γ∗ .
That is,
Φ(γ∗) ≤
N−1∑
m=n0−1
(
n0γ
∗
m+ 1
− γ∗
)(
N − 1
m
)
· (F ∗)m(1 − F ∗)N−1−m,
which is negative due to our consideration of n0 <
N and F∗ > 0. Thus there does not exist any
solution γ∗ to Φ(γ) = 0 satisfying R ≤ n0γ∗ in Stage
II.
• Suppose that there exists a solution γ∗ to Φ(γ) =
0 which satisfies R ≥ Nγ∗. We have Φ(γ∗) ≥
Φ(γ∗) |R=Nγ∗ . That is,
Φ(γ∗) ≥
N−1∑
m=n0−1
(
Nγ∗
m+ 1
− γ∗
)(
N − 1
m
)
· (F ∗)m(1 − F ∗)N−1−m,
which is positive due to our consideration of n0 < N
and F ∗ > 0. Thus there does not exist any solution
γ∗ to Φ(γ) = 0 satisfying R ≥ Nγ∗ in Stage II.
• When n0γ < R < Nγ, we first show that there exists
a solution γ∗ to Φ(γ) = 0 and then prove its unique-
ness. We can check that limγ→(R/N)+ Φ(γ) > 0 and
limγ→(R/n0)− Φ(γ) < 0. Due to the continuity of
Φ(γ) on γ, there exists a solution γ∗ to Φ(γ) = 0.
Next we prove the uniqueness of the solution by
contradiction.
Suppose there exist at least two different solutions
to Φ(γ) = 0. The first derivative Φ(γ) over γ at one
solution (denoted as γ∗ with corresponding F ∗) is
nonnegative. But we have
∂Φ(γ∗)
∂γ
=
N−1∑
m=n0−1
(
N − 1
m
)
(F ∗)
m−1
(1− F ∗)N−m−2
· [−F ∗(1 − F ∗) +
dF ∗
dγ
(
R
m+ 1
− γ∗)(m+ (1−N)F ∗)],
which is smaller than
N−1∑
m=n0−1
(
N − 1
m
)
(F ∗)m−1(1 − F ∗)N−m−2
· [
dF ∗
dγ
(
R
m+ 1
− γ∗)(m+ (1−N)F ∗)]. (28)
By substituting Φ(γ∗) = 0 with F = F ∗ into (28), we
can show
∂Φ(γ∗)
∂γ
<
N−1∑
m=n0−1
(
N − 1
m
)
(F ∗)m−1(1− F ∗)N−m−2
·
(
R
m+ 1
− γ∗
)
m
dF ∗
dγ
< 0, (29)
where F (·) is an increasing function. This contra-
dicts with our supposition that the first derivative
of ∂Φ(γ∗)/∂γ is nonnegative. This ends our proof of
the existence of unique solution γ∗ to Φ(γ) = 0.
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
We first prove the relation between γ∗ and R. Recall that
(29) has shown that Φ(γ∗) is decreasing in γ∗, while (4)
shows that Φ(γ∗) is linearly increasing in R. By applying
implicit function theorem, we can derive
dγ∗
dR
= −
∂Φ(γ∗)
∂γ
/
∂Φ(γ∗)
∂R
> 0.
Thus γ∗ is increasing in R.
Next we prove the relation between γ∗ and n0. Let us
denote F (γ∗) as F ∗ and define
φ(m) :=
(
R
m+ 1
− γ∗
)(
N − 1
m
)
(F ∗)m(1−F ∗)N−1−m,
then we can rewrite Φ(γ∗) in (4) as
∑N−1
n0−1
φ(m). Since
Section C shows that n0γ∗ < R < Nγ∗, φ(m) is positive
when m is small and is negative when m is large. As n0
increases to n0 + 1, previous positive term φ(n0 − 1) in
Φ(γ∗) disappears while all negative terms still remain.
Hence, Φ(γ∗) decreases with current n0. Recall that we
have shown in (29) that Φ(γ∗) is decreasing in γ∗, thus
γ∗ is decreasing in n0 due to Φ(γ∗) = 0.
Next we prove the relation between γ∗ and N . As
N increases to N + 1, we have an additional negative
term φ(N) appeared in the (4) (denoted by Φ˜(γ∗)). For a
previous term φ(m) with n0− 1 ≤ m ≤ N − 1, it changes
to
φ˜(m) =
(
R
m+ 1
− γ∗
)(
N
m
)
(F ∗)m(1 − F ∗)N−m.
Thus we can rewritten φ˜(m) = (1−F ∗)φ(m) NN−m , where
the fraction term is increasing in m. Then the absolute
value of a previously negative term φ(m) (with large m)
is relatively enlarged compared to a positive term (with
small m). Hence, the summation of the first N terms in
Φ˜(γ∗) is negative, and Φ˜(γ∗) with an additional negative
term φ(N) is further decreased to be negative. Recall that
we have shown in (29) that Φ(γ∗) is decreasing in γ∗,
thus γ∗ is decreasing in N due to Φ(γ∗) = 0.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 6
Recall that (6) shows that f(R) is linearly increasing in V
for any R values, thus the master’s equilibrium expected
payoff f(R∗) is increasing in V .
Next we prove that f(R) and f(R∗) are decreasing in
n0. Notice that the increase of n0 decreases the number of
(positive) summation terms in f(R), and affects F ∗ (i.e.,
F (γ∗)) in each term. Recall that Theorem 5 has shown
that γ∗ and thus F ∗ are decreasing in n0. Thus if we
can show that f(R) is also increasing in F ∗, then f(R)
is decreasing in n0.
The partial derivative of f(R) over F ∗ is
∂f(R)
∂F ∗
= (V −R)·
N∑
n=n0
(n−NF ∗)
(
N
n
)
(F ∗)n−1(1− F ∗)N−n−1. (30)
According to Theorem 4, the equilibrium collaborator
number is
n∗ =
N∑
n=0
n
(
N
n
)
(F ∗)n(1− F ∗)N−n,
which leads to n∗ = Nρ∗. Thus we have
(V −R)
N∑
n=0
(n−NF ∗)
(
N
n
)
(F ∗)n−1(1 − F ∗)N−n−1
=
V −R
F ∗(1 − F ∗)
(n∗ −NF ∗) = 0. (31)
Notice that the sign of each term in the summation
operation of (31) is decided by the relation between n
andNF ∗, thus a term with small n is negative and a term
with large n is positive. Compared to (31), ∂f(R)/∂F ∗ in
(30) has less negative terms in the summation operation
and is thus positive. Thus we conclude that f(R) and
equilibrium f(R∗) are decreasing in n0.
APPENDIX F
ANALYSIS OF MODEL (B) IN THREE INFORMA-
TION SCENARIOS
Here we turn to study Model (B) where the master will
reward only with successful collaboration. The analysis
of this model is very similar to Model (A), and in the
following we briefly discuss the difference between the
two models due to the page limit.
• Under complete information, we can derive the
same results as in Theorem 1 for Model (B), by using
a similar analysis.
• Under symmetrically incomplete information, for
the equilibrium of Stage II, we can similarly derive
the same pure strategy NE as in Theorem 2 for
Model (B), but the mixed strategy NE is different.
The mixed strategy NE exists only when R is suffi-
ciently large, and the equilibrium probability p∗ in
(3) is the unique solution to
Em
(
R
m+ 1
1{m+1≥n0} − µ
)
= 0,
where the expectation E is taken over the ran-
dom variable m that follows a binomial distribution
B(N−1, p). For the equilibrium of the whole collab-
oration game, we can still derive the same results as
in Theorem 3.
• Under asymmetrically incomplete information, for
the equilibrium of Stage II, we can derive a similar
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equilibrium decision threshold γ∗(R) as the solution
to
Em
(
R
m+ 1
1{m+1≥n0} − γ
)
= 0, (32)
where the expectation is taken over m that follows
a binomial distribution B(N − 1, F (γ)).25 Then we
can similarly analyze the master’s maximization
problem in (6). The difference fromModel (A) is that
here the master needs to determine a larger reward
R to attract enough users who face a higher risk.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THEOREM 8
Proof. By observing Problem (11), the master will only
hire type-i users when his marginal utility is larger than
marginal cost (i.e., reward to users) at ti = 0. That is,
dpii(ti)
dti
∣∣∣
ti=0
=
(
Niθi
1 +Niti
−NiKi
)
|ti=0 = Ni(θi−Ki) > 0,
which does not depend on the other types. Thus the
master will hire type-i users only when θi > Ki. Since
pii(ti) is concave in 0 ≤ ti ≤ t¯i, we can directly examine
the first-order condition of pii(ti) over ti for each type.
Then we can derive the equilibrium contract item for
type-i in (13).
By substituting all contract items into the objective
function in Problem (10), we can further derive the
master’s equilibrium profit in (14).
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
H.1 Proof of sufficient conditions
We use mathematical induction to prove the three con-
ditions in Proposition 1 are sufficient conditions for
contract feasibility. Let us denote C(l) as a subset which
contains the first l task-reward combinations in the con-
tract C. That is, C(l) = {(ri, ti)}li=1.
We first show that C(1) is feasible. Since there is only
one user type, the contract is feasible as long as it satisfies
IR constraint for type-1. This is true due to Condition(+)
in Proposition 1.
Next we show that if contract C(l) is feasible, then the
new contract C(l + 1) by adding new item (rl+1, tl+1)
is also feasible. To achieve this, we need to show the
following results.
• Result I: the IC and IR constraints for type-(l+ 1)
users:{
rl+1 −Kl+1tl+1 ≥ ri −Kl+1ti, ∀i = 1, ..., l
rl+1 −Kl+1tl+1 ≥ 0,
(33)
25. Note that the solution to (32) will exist only whenR is sufficiently
large, and the solution may not be unique. If there exist two solutions
(denoted by γ∗
1
and γ∗
2
with γ∗
1
< γ∗
2
), each user i will pick up γ∗
2
instead of γ∗
1
since it gives him a larger payoff γ∗
2
− Ci (i.e., pareto-
optimal for all users).
• Result II: for the original l types already contained in
the contract C(l), the IC constraints are still satisfied
after adding the new type-(l+ 1):
ri −Kiti ≥ rl+1 −Kitl+1, ∀i = 1, ..., l. (34)
Note that the new contract C(l + 1) will satisfy the
IR constraints for all original l types of users, since
the original contract C(l) is feasible.
Proof of Result I in (33): First, we prove the IC constraint
for type-(l + 1). Since contract C(l) is feasible, the IC
constraint for a type-i user must hold, i.e.,
rj −Kltj ≤ rl −Kltl, ∀j = 1, ..., l.
Also, the left inequality of (19) in Condition(≤) can be
transformed to
rl +Kl+1(tl+1 − tl) ≤ rl+1.
By combining the above two inequalities, we have
rj−Kltj+Kl+1(tl+1−tl) ≤ rl+1−Kltl, ∀j = 1, ..., l. (35)
Notice that Kl+1 < Kl and tj ≤ tl in Condition(↑), we
also have
Kl+1(tl − tj) ≤ Kl(tl − tj).
By substituting this inequality into (35), we have
rl+1 −Kl+1tl+1 ≥ rj −Kl+1tj , (36)
which is actually the IC constraint for type-(l + 1).
Next, we show that the IR constraint for type-(l + 1).
Since Kl+1 < Kj for any j ≤ l, then
rj −Kl+1tj ≥ rj −Kjtj .
By combining this inequality and (36), we have
rl+1 −Kl+1tl+1 ≥ rj −Kjtj ≥ 0,
due to the IR constraint for type-j. Thus we prove the
IR constraint for type-(l+ 1) in (33).
Proof of Result II in (34): Since contract C(l) is feasible,
the IC constraint for type-j holds, i.e.,
rl −Kjtl ≤ rj −Kjtj , ∀j = 1, ..., l.
Also, we can transform the right inequality of (19) in
Condition(≤) to
rl+1 ≤ rl +Kl(tl+1 − tl).
By combining the above two inequalities, we conclude
rl+1 −Kjtl ≤ Kl(tl+1 − tl) + rj −Kjtj .
Notice that Kl < Kj and tl+1 ≥ tl in Condition(↑), we
also have
Kl(tl+1 − tl) ≤ Kj(tl+1 − tl).
By combining the above two inequalities, we conclude
rj −Kjtj ≥ rl+1 −Kjtl+1, ∀j = 1, ..., l,
which is actually the IC constraint for type-j in (34).
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H.2 Proof of necessary conditions
We prove the three conditions in Proposition 1 are
necessary conditions for contract feasibility. It is easy
to see that Condition(+) is just the IR condition for
type-1 in a feasible contract. Also, the right inequality
of Condition(≤) can be derived from the IC constraint
for type-(i − 1), and the left inequality can be derived
from the IC constraint for type-i.
Next we prove Condition(↑) is also the necessary
condition. We divide the proof into two parts.
• We first prove that if Ki > Kj then ti ≤ tj by
contradiction. Suppose ti > tj , then we have
Ki(ti − tj) > Kj(ti − tj), (37)
due to Ki > Kj . Notice that the feasible contract
satisfies the IC constraints for type-i and type-j
users, we have
ri −Kiti ≥ rj −Kitj ,
and
rj −Kjtj ≥ ri −Kjti.
By combining the above two inequalities, we con-
clude
Kiti +Kjtj ≤ Kitj +Kjti,
which contradicts with (37).
• We then prove that ti ≥ tj if and only if ri ≥ rj .
– If ti > tj , we want to prove ri > rj . Due to the
IC constraint for type-i, we have
ri −Kiti ≥ rj −Kitj ,
which can be transformed to
ri − rj ≥ Ki(ti − tj).
Since ti > tj , we can derive ri > rj from the
above inequality.
– If ri > rj , we want to prove that ti > tj . Due to
the IC constraint for type-j, we have
rj −Kjtj ≥ ri −Kjti,
which can be transformed to
Kj(ti − tj) ≥ ri − rj .
Since ri > rj , we can derive ti > tj from the
above inequality.
– Using a similar analysis, we can prove that ri =
rj if and only if ti = tj .
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF THEOREM 9
All involved users in set IA will receive positive rewards
and tasks. According to Condition(↑), the rewards and
tasks are non-decreasing in the types. Let us denote the
lowest type of involved users in set IA as type-ˆ. If
ˆ = 1, then relation (21) shows that a type-1 collaborator
receives a zero payoff. If ˆ > 1, then any lower type
k < ˆ is not in set IA, and receives zero task and zero
reward. By using relation (22), we can further derive that
r∗ˆ = Kˆt
∗
ˆ , which means the lowest type collaborator still
obtains a zero payoff.
According to (22), the type-i collaborator’s equilibrium
payoff is r∗i −Kit
∗
i = r
∗
i−1−Kit
∗
i−1, which is strictly larger
than type-(i− 1) collaborator’s payoff r∗i−1−Ki−1t
∗
i−1 as
Ki < Ki−1. Thus a higher type collaborators receive a
larger positive payoff.
Next we show which types of users are involved as
collaborators. By observing the first derivative of the
master’s expected profit over ti in (24), ti only appears
in the last bracket. The master will involve type-i users
only when the last bracket of (24) is positive at ti = 0.
This leads to the collaborator set in (27). By comparing
IC in (12) and IA in (27), we conclude that |IA| ≤ |IC |.
